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Impact of Flood and Erosion Damage and Cost of Protection 
on the Northern Ohio Regional Economy, 1972-1976 
Introduction 
One hundred and ninety miles of Lake Erie's shoreline fall 
under the jurisdiction of Ohio. This area is particularly 
valuable to the state as a center of industry, commerce, agri-
culture, and recreation. It is also a densely populated region. 
However, much of the land is susceptible to periodic flood and 
erosion damages from the Lake associated with high winds and 
storms. 
Few estimates of damage to shoreline property and the 
economic losses to private property owners due to flooding and 
erosion have been made. Some studies have focused on the 
potential costs of protecting the shoreline; others on measures 
to control and regulate Lake Erie water levels to avoid the high 
levels that increase the probability of damage in the event of a 
storm and the low levels that interfere with recreational and 
commercial interests. Some studies have dealt with the problem 
at the local level and are project-specific. 
In the early 1970s, the lower Great Lakes were especially 
hard hit by storms that caused extensive property damage. In 
November 1972, in March 1973 and again in April 1974, several 
counties in northern Ohio were declared federal disaster areas 
due to the severity of the storm-related damage they sustained. 
In 1976, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was charged with 
conducting an extensive survey of private property owners along 
the entire U.S. Great Lakes shoreline in orde~ to assess the 
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extent and nature of damages occurring during that period and the 
expenditures made to protect their properties. In this study we 
utilize the damage and cost of protection estimates generated by 
the Corps study for the state of Ohio. Using an input-output 
model of the northern Ohio regional economy, an attempt is made 
to estimate the amount of resources within the region that went 
for the restoration, 
property instead of 
services. 
replacement and/or protection of private 
for production of the usual goods and 
Characteristics of Lake Erie and Its Shoreline 
The state of Ohio includes over 190 miles or about 56 
percent of the U.S. Lake Erie shoreline (GLBCb, 1976). Generally 
the land bordering the western basin is low-lying and at one time 
contained extensive wetlands. Today, although much of the 
original marshland has been drained, some areas of northwestern 
Ohio remain flood-prone. 
Approximately 79 percent of Ohio's Lake Erie coastline is 
classified as being susceptible to erosion (Table 1). As shown 
in Figure 1, erodible lands of the western basin are of the low 
bluff and low plain type whereas erodible high bluffs dominate 
the southeastern shore. Although erosion is an ongoing, natural 
process along Lake Erie, it is exacerbated during periods of high 
water and during storms. 
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Table 1. Classification of Ohio's Lake Erie Shoreline by Land Type 
Land Type Miles Percent 
Erodible 
Erodible High Bluff 72. 7 38 
Erodible Low Bluff 55.1 29 
Erodible Low Plain 19.9 10 
Wetlands/Erodible Plain 3.5 2 
Total 151.2 79 
Non-Erodible 
Artifical Fill Areas 15 .1 8 
Low Sand Dune 12.4 7 
Non-Erodible Low Bluff 5.5 3 
Wetlands 4.1 2 
Non-Erodible High Bluff 2.0 1 
Total 39.1 21 
Total 190.3 100 
Source: GLBCb, 1976. 
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Ohio's Lake Erie shoreline is highly developed and densely 
populated. In 1970, only 14 percent of the shoreline was 
undeveloped or devoted to agriculture. Another two percent was 
forest and woodland whereas over half was classified as resi-
dential (GLBCe, 1976). 
In that year, publically owned land made up nearly 20 
percent of the total, including fairly large state and federal 
wildlife refuges and parks just east of Toledo and county and 
municipal recreational land elsewhere along the coast. Eight 
percent of the land was held by industrial firms; much of it 
concentrated in the east around Conneaut, Ashtabula, Painesville, 
Fairport Harbor, Cleveland and Lorain, and at the extreme western 
end of the state in Toledo. 
Lake Erie is the shallowest of the Great Lakes with an 
average depth of only 62 feet. From the shallows at the western 
end where water depths average 25 to 30 feet, the Lake drops to a 
maximum depth of 212 feet in the east (GLBCa, 1976). 
Lake Erie is situated so that its long axis is oriented in a 
general southwest-northeast direction along the path of the 
prevailing southwest winds. It is characterized by lowlands at 
its western end and bluffs of over 30 feet in height along much 
of the length of its central and eastern basins. It is this 
unique combination of factors which makes Lake Erie especially 
susceptible to storm damage. 
High winds accompanying low pressure systems originating 
from the northeast can push water to the western end of the Lake. 
Here it gradually builds up since subsurface flows are restricted 
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by the shallowness of the Lake. If such weather disturbances are 
of sufficient duration, water can inundate low-lying areas 
causing flood, erosion and wave damage to property and struc-
tures. Although the high bluff shoreline areas of the central 
basin are susceptible to erosion, during the period covered in 
this study, erosion-related damages tended to be concentrated in 
the western basin. 
Lake Erie Water Levels 
Lake Erie water levels vary seasonally. Peak volumes are 
reached during the summer months and lows occur in the winter. 
Although a number of factors--freezing, snow and ice melt, 
evaporation, ground water flows and crustal movements--contribute 
to these seasonal variations, the most significant determining 
factor is precipitation which adds to the Lake's volume directly 
and also indirectly through the runoff carried by streams and 
rivers within the Lake's natural drainage basin. 
With their large areas, the Great Lakes can usually handle 
short-term excesses of precipitation although the capacities of 
the rivers connecting and draining them are limited. Thus, if 
precipitation is abnormally high over time as during the period 
covered in this report, Lake levels may rise and remain sig-
nificantly above their long-term averages for long periods of 
time. The potential for storm-related damage is greater under 
these conditions since deeper water allows waves to achieve 
greater heights and to break with greater force closer to the 
shore. In addition, high water levels change the effect of waves 
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on the shoreline in that natural beaches are submerged and waves 
can act directly on the more susceptible backshore, accelerating 
the normal erosion process. 
The 1972-1974 Storm Events 
Historically there have been a number of damaging northeast 
storms on Lake Erie, most of which occurred when water levels 
were high (Figure 2). Data in Figure 3 indicate that prior to 
and during the study period (September 1972 to September 1976), 
average annual precipitation over the entire Great Lakes basin 
and within the Lake Erie basin itself was greater than the 
long-term average. It was the severity, destructiveness and 
close spacing of the storms that made the early to mid 1970s a 
unique period for Lake Erie's shore communities. 
The Storm of November 13 and 14, 1972 
The storm of November 13 and 14, 1972 is considered one of 
the worst natural disasters in Ohio's history (Carter, 1973). It 
occurred when Lake Erie was about two feet above its long-term 
November average. A northeast wind began early on November 13 
and continued until late on the 15th, eventually reaching speeds 
up to 45 miles per hour (Carter, 1973). The strong winds forced 
water to pile up against and then inundate extensive areas of the 
southwest shore. At one point, water levels reached a height at 
Toledo of more than six feet above the long-term November 
average, and waves of up to 12 feet were generated (Carter, 
1973). 
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Figure 3. Annual Precipitation Within the Lake Erie and Great Lakes Basins, 
1952-1975. 
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Residents from Huron, Ohio to Monroe, Michigan were forced 
to evacuate their homes because of flooding and waves. Many 
homes, roads and protective structures such as seawalls, dikes, 
beaches and dunes were damaged or destroyed. Flooding occurred 
where waves breached dikes and other protective structures 
surrounding low-lying areas. Because some of the land in north-
west Ohio contains high levels of clay, floodwater could not 
readily percolate downward, and in some places, the ground was 
covered with water for several days. 
Following the storm, seven Ohio counties (Lucas, Ottawa, 
Erie, Sandusky, Lorain, Cuyahoga and Lake) and nine Michigan 
counties were declared a major disaster area by the Small 
Business Administration. This made flood victims eligible for 
low-interest loans to restore and/or replace damaged or lost 
property and structures. Eventually northern Ohio was declared a 
major disaster area by President Nixon which made federal funds 
available for direct relief and for the repair and restoration of 
public facilities. 
In making his request for federal aid, Ohio's Governor 
Gilligan estimated that more than $22 million of damage had been 
sustained in Ohio (Toledo Blade, November 24, 1972). A pre-
liminary survey showed damages of $12 million to 2000 homes and 
$500 thousand to 24 businesses in Lucas, Ottawa and Sandusky 
counties alone (Toledo Blade, November 18, 1972). Eventually as 
a result of this storm, certain Ohio cities and townships within 
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the disaster counties and the Ohio Departments of Natural Resour-
ces and of Transportation were granted a total of $615,862 of 
direct federal aid (Deborah Patchen, 1984). 
Operation Foresight 
The Detroit District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers publishes 
monthly estimates of anticipated water levels for the Great Lakes 
which are then extended for the next six months. During the 
second half of 1972 when above-average levels of precipitation 
fell within the Great Lakes drainage basin, forecasters predicted 
that the spring, 1973 water levels would approach or exceed the 
last extreme high of 1952 and possibly cause severe flooding 
around the Great Lakes except Lake Superior. In view of these 
predictions, Operation Foresight was activated and authorized on 
December 15, 1972. Ohio's governor responded to the announcement 
on January 30, 1973. 
Operation Foresight, a program initiated under the pro-
visions of PL84-99, authorized the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
to conduct studies to determine sites along the Great Lakes 
shoreline where temporary flood emergency operations would be 
practical (erosion control was not specifically provided for 
under Operation Foresight). Among the criteria set out in the 
law were that flood protection measures must exceed the capabi-
lities of state or local resources, be justified from an economic 
and engineering standpoint, be of a temporary nature, be designed 
to handle the anticipated high water levels and be completed in 
time to be of use. As outlined in the laws, maintenance and 
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removal of protective structures were local responsibilities. In 
some cases where a project was not approved, materials were 
offered on a self-help basis to communities that agreed to supply 
voluntary labor. 
Fifty-nine communities in seven states received $26.8 
million of assistance through Operation Foresight (Table 2). 
Eighty-four percent ($22.3 million) went for contract projects 
and the rest was spent on self-help materials, mainly sandbags. 
Among the protective structures built under contract were 
earthdikes, riprap, sand and rock-filled cribs and stone-filled 
gabions. 1 The target date for completion of the projects was 
fall 1973 to early spring 1974. 
Eight of the communities that received contract assistance 
were in Ohio.2 Altogether they received $8.6 million or 40 
percent of the total contract project award made to the seven 
states. Ohio's share of the self-help funds amounted to $175 
thousand or four percent of the self-help total. Overall, the 
state of Ohio received nearly $8.8 million of Operation Foresight 
funds: 33 percent of the total allocated to the seven states. 
1 
2 
Gabions are offshore breakwaters designed to protect beaches. 
Riprap consists of a layer, facing or protective mound of 
stones randomly placed to prevent erosion. Cribs are large 
crate-like structures built against slopes and filled with 
rock or sand to lend support and protect the slopes from 
erosion (U.S. Army-NCO, 1978, U.S. Army-LCSP, 1978). 
The eight project sites were Point Place in Toledo, Reno 
Beach/Howard Farms, Bay Township, Whites Landing, Bayview, 
Eastlake, Conneaut Water Intake and Crystal Rock. Forty-five 
other sites in Ohio were considered and then rejected because 
they failed to meet one or more of the Operation Foresight 
guidelines. 
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Table 2. Operation Foresight Costs and Estimates of Damage Prevented to the 
Great Lakes Shoreline, 1973-1974. 
Estimated 
Costs1 Damages Prevented 
$ million (percent) 
Contract Projects2 
Ohio 8.621 (39) 22.126 (18) 
Other States3 14.192 (61) 97.859 (82) 
Total 22.318 ( 1 oo) 119.985 (100) 
Self-Help Projects 
Ohio .175 (4) .477 (6) 
Other States3 4.257 (96) 11.800 (94) 
Total 4.432 ( 100) 12.277 ( 100) 
Total 
Ohio 8.796 (33) 22.603 (17) 
Other States3 18.017 (67) 109.659 (83) 
Total 26.813 (100) 132.262 ( 100) 
1Includes materials and administration costs. 
2contracts were awarded to local firms by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 
3other states included Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, New York and 
Pennsylvania. 
Source: U.S. Army-Detroit, 1977. 
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The March, 1973 and April, 1974 Storms 
Much less detail is available on the other two major storms. 
However, a similar sequence of events occurred in March, 1973 as 
with the November, 1972 storm. The April, 1974 storm was 
associated with a weather disturbance that caused the Xenia 
tornado. 
In the aftermath of the March, 1973 storm, eight northern 
Ohio counties were declared a major disaster area by the Presi-
dent and by the Small Business Administration. After the April, 
1974 storm, three Ohio counties (Lucas, Ottawa and Sandusky) were 
designated as a disaster area. Flooding associated with both of 
these storms was worse than that which occurred in 1972 because 
of higher water levels (Figure 4). 
In 1973, $1.418 million in federal aid went to cities, 
villages and townships within the eight county disaster area as 
well as to the Ohio Department of Natural Resources and to Camp 
Perry, a National Guard installation (Deborah Patchen, 1984). In 
1974, certain cities, towns, villages and conservancy districts 
within the three county disaster area and the Ohio Departments of 
Natural Resources and of Transportation recaived federal grants 
totaling $8~9 thousand (Deborah Patchen, 1984). 
The eight Ohio Operation Foresight contract projects were 
completed between April and November 1973 so they were not in 
place until after two of the three major storms of the study 
period. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers estimat~d that in Ohio, 
Operation Foresight projects prevented more than $22.6 million of 
....:l 
~ 
> ~ 
....:l 
~ 
~ 
U) 
~ 
> 0 
CQ 
~ 
8 
~ 
~ 
~ 
Figure 4. Average Monthly Lake Erie Water Levels: 
573 
572 
571 
570 
569 
568 
March, April and November, 1960-1975. 
•--• .March 
J(-- >< April 
o-- o November 
November 
1972 Storm~ 
l/\ ,x~ 
fZ~s'><, )!;./ Tl z 
..,77 J?1 
0 r-l N M 
""' 
1.1") l.O r-- co 
°' 
0 r-l 
l.O l.O l.O l.O l.O l.O l.O l.O l.O l.O r-- r--
°' °' °' "' "' °' °' °' °' °' °' "' r-l r-l r-l r-l r-l r-l r-l r-l r-l r-l r-f r-l 
Source: USDC-NOAA, No date, pg. 47. 
Storm 
f-' 
U1 
April Average 
March Average 
November Average 
N M 
""' 
1.1") l.O 
r-- r-- r-- r-- r--
°' "' °' °' °' r-l r-l r-l r-f r-l
16 
damage through 1974.3 The Corps of Engineers inspected the 
eight contract project sites in 1976 and found them all func-
tional. The 1976 status report referred to additional flooding 
in the fall and winter of 1973, March 1974 and the spring of 
1975. A newspaper account mentioned that three windstorms in 
1973 were associated with some shoreline flooding (Sandusky 
Register, 1974). To what extent damages at Operation Foresight 
sites were lessened by the presence of protective structures is 
unknown. 
Damage Estimation 
As a result of the unusual amount of damage sustained by the 
lower Great Lakes states in the early 1970s, the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers funded studies to assess the extent of damage to 
private property along the Lakes from Labor Day 1972 to Labor Day 
1976. (The Corps of Engineers report cited here did not contain 
estimates of damages to public property.) In this study we use 
the results for the state of Ohio within the analytical framework 
of an input-output model for northern Ohio to estimate the total 
economic damages from these storm events between 1972 and 1976. 
3 Field crews visited each site to determine at what water 
levels zero, intermediate and maximum amounts of flooding 
would occur. Using average property and structure value 
assessments for the area and applying water level projections 
that were termed ''most probable," the Corps of Engineers 
derived their estimates of damages prevented. Because of 
time constraints, their calculations were necessarily rough. 
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Data from the Corps of Engineers Study 
The study area for Ohio was defined as the 100-year open 
coast flood level and included properties both inland and along 
the Lake in eight northern Ohio counties: Lucas, Ottawa, 
Sandusky, Erie, Lorain, Cuyahoga, Lake and Ashtabula. The study 
area was then divided into subreaches based upon the suscep-
tibility of the land to erosion and/or flood damage, certain 
demographic characteristics and proximity to the shore. 
Field teams were sent to the eight county seats and infor-
mation about each property was collected. Mailing lists were 
generated according to land use. The land use categories were: 
residential, commercial, industrial, transportation, utilities 
and agriculture/forestry (Data on public property were not 
collected for this report). Due to the large number of resi-
dential properties, a sample based on assessed property values 
was selected statistically and through linear extrapolation the 
sample results were later expanded to reflect the total popu-
lation. All property owners in other land-use categories were 
sent questionnaires and the survey results were linearly extra-
polated to account for non-responses. 
Lake Erie's commercial sector at the time of the study was 
made up of diverse firms. Nearly 60 percent of the commercial 
firms were identified by private names only and could not be 
categorized. Of the commercial firms which could be categorized 
30 percent were marina/boat sales operations, 12 percent were 
recreation-oriented such as sports clubs and camps, 9 percent 
were categorized as retail and 8 percent each were associated 
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with real estate or chemicals. Other commercial properties along 
Lake Erie were components of sectors such as finance, construc-
tion, electricity, eating/drinking establishments, wholesale, 
water transportation, commercial fishing, communications and 
machinery. 
Thirty-nine land parcels were owned by industrial firms from 
the following sectors: paper and allied products, stone, clay 
and glass, chemi~als and primary non-ferrous metals. In the 
Corps of Engineers study, commercial and industrial firms were 
grouped together. 
Firms in the transportation category were railroads and a 
docking company, and several different power companies operating 
along the shoreline were classed as utilities. Residences and 
agricultural/forest land were owned by individuals and there were 
no data to enable any characterization of these properties. 
Estimates of Damage and Protection Costs 
Corps of Engineers questionnaires were designed to collect 
detailed information from survey respondents on the amount and 
type of erosion and flood damage done to private property during 
the four year study period. Data were also collected on the 
costs incurred by property owners for shore and property protec-
tion. However, it was beyond the scope of this study to review 
individual questionnaires. Instead, sample surveys for each 
land-use category were examined and from information in the 
directions and throughout the questionnaires, a general idea 
about the nature of damages and protection was gained. 
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Damage 
The distribution of flood and erosion damages by county is 
summarized in Table 3. Flood damages were concentrated in the 
western basin counties, especially Lucas and Ottawa which 
together accounted for 81 percent of the total. Central basin 
counties, in contrast, sustained only four percent of the flood 
damages. Western basin counties suffered nearly two thirds of 
the erosion damages over the study period. Among the hardest hit 
counties were Erie with 36 percent of the total and Ottawa with 
26 percent. Damages to the four central basin counties were 
nearly equal. 
Table 4 summarizes the extent of flooding and erosion damage 
to private property by sector during the period 1972 to 1976. 
Overall, flooding and erosion damages were nearly equal; both 
were over $32 million. An examination of Table 4 reveals that 
residential property owners suffered the greatest losses of the 
five sectors: 92 percent of the flood damages and 90 percent of 
the erosion damages. Commercial/industrial property owners 
sustained three percent of the flood and nine percent of the 
erosion damages whereas owners of agricultural/forest lands 
accounted for five percent of flood-related damages and less than 
one percent of erosion ~amages. Utility and transportation 
properties were virtually untouched by floods and each sustained 
less than one percent of the erosion damages. 
Table 5 lists for each sector and for each damage category 
examples taken from the respective sample questionnaires to 
illustrate the types of property damage occurring over the study 
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Table 3. Percentage Distribution of Flood and Erosion Damage to the Study 
Region by County, 1972-1976. 
Western Basin 
Lucas 
Ottawa 
Sandusky 
Erie 
Subtotal 
Central Basin 
Lorain 
Cuyahoga 
Lake 
Ashtabula 
Subtotal 
Source: Bedford, et al. 1978. 
Flood 
32 
49 
2 
13 
96 
<1 
2 
1 
<1 
4 
Damage 
(percent) 
Erosion 
2 
26 
1 
36 
65 
6 
11 
8 
10 
35 
"' 
Table 4. Flood and Erosion Damages to the Study Region by Sector, 1972-1976. 
Structure Grounds 
and and Clean Emergency Financial Other Total 
Contents l!i!rovements u2 Evacuation Loss Damages Damage 
Fl.00(1 ($!'!) (SM) (SM) ($!'!) ($!'!) (SM) I Percent) 
Residential 14.27& 7 .107 l.198 0 2.75& 4.235 29.572 (92) 
Commoercial/Industrial .263 .413 .121 .011 .199 .026 l.033 (3) 
Transportation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10) 
1.:Cilities 0 0 0 u 0 Q 0 IO) 
A~ri~ulture/Farestrv 0 0 0 0 0 l.613 l.&13 (;) 
focal l.!.. ))9 7.520 1. Jl9 .011 2.955 5,874 32. 218 (100) 
iROSlO!'\ 
-·- l'V 
Residential 5.578 13.177 I. 357 0 1. 861 7.180 29.153 (90) ...... 
Coamercial/Industrial .881 l.492 0 0 .013 • 724 3. llO (9) 
Transportation 0 0 0 0 0 .036 .0)6 (<l) 
l!tilities 0 0 0 0 0 .008 .008 «l) 
Agriculture/Foresrrv 0 0 0 0 0 .08.!. .08!. •'I l 
Total &.459 14.669 i.n1 0 l.87.!. '!.032 32.391 !lOIJJ 
-- ---------
Source: Bedford, et al. 1978. 
Table 5. Flood and Erosion Damages by Sector and by Type and Percent of Total Damages Sustained by Private Property Owners, 1972-1976. 1 
Sector 
Residential 
CJ::m.ercial/ 
Industrial 
Structures 
and 
Contents 
residential buildings 
contents, detatched 
garages, non-residen-
t ial build in~s 
ll ~ 
~oundations, •alls, 
~erchandise. equip-
:r.ent. r~,· ':"" :~. con-
t~nts, ~to~k r~dec-
0ration, paintin~ 
Transrortation bluff repair3, repairs 
of rig:hts .1f wav, 
foundations, pavements, 
~urfaces, ~quipment 
l:tillties 
A~riculture/ 
Forestrv 
machinerv, furnl-
t•1re and f lxtures, 
";Jai.ns. lines, 
..:ab Les, mete rs 
Grounds 
and 
Improvements 
docks, ramps. boat-
houses, stairways, 
lawns, trees, land-
3Caping, septic 
svstems 
. 31% 
parking lots, walls 
signs, lawns, shrubs, 
docks. ,,.·harves, ~.~at 
and beach houses 
)7, 
roads, storage 
areas 
Clean t:p 
clean up 
44 
clean up 
<:1' 
cl~an U? ~f equip-
ment, grounds and 
stru-::tures 
Emergency 
Evacuation 
2 
evacuation and 
reoccupation 
(;,o•:ini;: g0ods. 
temporary leas-
ing space) 
<U: 
Financial 
Loss 
loss of rental and 
business inco• 
7% 
loss of business 
income and employee 
•·.:i.ges 
!" 
loss of business 
and emplo\•ee 
'-'ages 
loss ,.,f business 
income and e~~lovee 
·.:a2es 
---------- -----------
1?ercentages •re hased un t.•tal flood and erosion damages: 564.bOQ ~illinn. P~rcenta~es total 'i00 percent due t~ r~u:tdin~. 
~ • .i ln!nrmatbtn 1•11 th~ n.irurc: \ll these .!dmages was rr"\'i...!!::!d l~n rhl! ~u~st i..._:nnJire. 
:iource: Bedford. ~t ..ll. !·~id 
Other 
Da111ages 
2 
18% 
l": 
temporarv re rout i:tg 
costs, increased 
.:>perating costs 
<1% 
"'l ~ 
ivest0~k •. ·rops. 
lt'!:'I. equipment. 
e1~ce-; 
3% 
-----------
IV 
IV 
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period. From this table, sectors in northern Ohio which were 
directly and indirectly affected by Lake Erie storms may be 
determined. 
As noted previously, the residential sector accounted for 
the majority of the $64.6 million of erosion and flood-related 
damages. Thirty-one percent of that total ($20 million) occurred 
in the residential "structures and contents" category which 
included residences and furnishings, detatched garages and other 
outbuildings on residential properties. Another 31 percent was 
spent on residential "grounds and improvements" such as docks, 
boat ramps, boathouses, stairways, septic systems and land-
scaping. The remaining expenditures made by the residential 
sector were for clean-up, loss of rental or business income and 
"other costs" which could not be characterized due to lack of 
data. Flood and erosion damages for all other sectors were 
minimal when compared to those of the residential sector. 
Costs of Protection 
The distribution of protection costs by county summarized in 
Table 6 reveals that 87 percent of flood protection expenditures 
were made by property owners in the western basin. Over 50 
percent of flood protection costs were borne by property owners 
in Ottawa county. Erosion protection expenditures on the other 
hand were more evenly distributed between the western and central 
basins. Expenditures were minimal in Lucas and Sandusky counties 
but Erie and Ottawa counties together accounted for 44 percent of 
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Table 6. Percentage Distribution of Flood and Erosion Protection Costs for 
the Study Region, by County, 1972-1976. 
Costs of Protection 
Flood Erosion 
(percent) 
Western Basin 
Lucas 17 1 
Ottawa 53 18 
Sandusky 7 1 
Erie 10 26 
Total 87 46 
Central Basin 
Lorain 3 17 
Cuyahoga 6 13 
Lake 3 11 
Ashtabula 1 13 
Total TI 54 
Source: Bedford, et al. 1978. 
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the total. Property owners in the central basin spent 54 percent 
of the total cost of erosion protection. Those expenditures were 
spread fairly evenly among the four counties. 
Cost of protection data, by sector, appear in Table 7. As 
expected, residential property owners spent the most: 76 percent 
of flood protection expenditures and 92 percent of outlays for 
erosion protection. Property owners of the agriculture/forestry 
sector accounted for 21 percent of the total spent on flood 
protection. Protection costs for all other sectors were less 
than five percent. 
Seventy-five percent of total protection costs was spent by 
residents for protective structures like seawalls, revetments and 
groins (Table 8).4 Another three percent was spent on mate-
rials and labor for relocation of residence and seven percent was 
categorized as "other costs." The only other significant 
expenditures occurred in the agriculture/forestry sector under 
the category "other costs." Eleven percent of the total was 
spent by private property owners in this sector for flood 
proofing, ground covers, fences, draining tiles and irrigation 
lines. Costs of protection were minimal in the other sectors. 
4 Revetments and groins are stone or concrete shore protection 
structures. The former are designed to protect embankments 
from erosion and the latter are built perpendicular to the 
shore to retard beach erosion (U.S. Army-NCO, 1978, U.S. 
Army-LCSP, 1978). 
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Table 7. Flood and Erosion Protection Costs Within the Study Region by 
Sector, 1972-1976. 
Protective Other 
Relocations Structures Costs Total Costs 
($ Mil.) ($ Mil.) ($ Mil.) $ Mil. (percent) 
Flood 
Residential 1.012 9.921 1. 773 12.706 (76) 
Commercial/Industrial 0 .115 .400 .515 (3) 
Transportation 0 0 0 0 (0) 
Utilities 0 .002 0 .002 (<1) 
Agric./Forestry 0 0 3.596 3.596 (21) 
Total 1.012 10.038 5.769 16.819 ( 100) 
Erosion 
Residential .295 18. 726 .739 19.760 (92) 
Commercial/Industrial .013 .589 .227 .829 (4) 
Transportation 0 .075 0 .075 (<1) 
Utilities .150 .008 0 .158 ( 1) 
Agric./Forestry 0 0 .696 .696 (3) 
Total .458 19.398 1.662 21.518 (100) 
Source: Bedford, et al. 1978. 
Table 8. Cost of Protection by Sector and by Type and Percent of Protection Costs Spent 
by Category, 1972-1976.1 
Sector 
Residential 
Commercial/ 
Industrial 
Transportation 
Utilities 
Agriculture/ 
Forestry 
Relocations 
relocation of home/ 
cottage (materials 
and labor) 
3% 
relocation of 
facilities and 
roads 
<1% 
relocation of RR 
lines, roads, and 
bridges 
relocation of 
facilities 
< 1% 
relocation of 
structures 
Protective 
Structure 
revetments 
sea walls 
groins 
75% 
jetties, groins 
revetments, dikes, 
levees, seawalls, 
flood-proofing, 
costs of temporary 
shore-up of struc-
tures 
2% 
permanent protec-
tion to prevent 
damage to RR lines, 
roads, bridges 
<1% 
emergency and 
permanent protec-
tion 
< 1% 
2 
Other Costs 
2 
7% 
____ 2 
2% 
____ 2 
2 
flood-proofing, 
terracing, fen-
ces, irrigation, 
lines, drainage, 
tiles, planting 
of ground cover 
11% 
1Percentages are based on total flood and erosion protection expenditures: $38.337 million. 
2No information on the nature of these damages was provided on the questionnaire. 
Source: Bedford, et al. 1978. 
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The Input-Output Model 
A change in one sector of an economy leads to changes in its 
other sectors. To measure the total impact of a change in one 
economic activity on the whole economy, it is necessary to trace 
out the indirect effects on all other economic sectors in 
addition to the direct impact. To accomplish this, it is 
necessary to know how the various economic sectors relate to each 
other. One method that does this is input-output (I/O) analysis. 
In I/O analysis, all economic activity is categorized into 
either endogenous or exogenous sectors. Firms within a given 
endogenous sector produce a set of similar goods and services for 
sale to other endogenous sectors or to exogenous or final demand 
sectors such as export and household consumption. The flow table 
of an I/O model describes the demand and supply relationships of 
an economy in equilibrium by showing final demand for goods and 
services and the interindustry transactions required to satisfy 
the demand. Coefficients which measure the direct and indirect 
effects of changes in output in each sector resulting from a $1 
change in final demand for a given processing sector are derived 
from the flow tables. I/O models also permit calculations of the 
impact on regional output, income and employment caused by 
changes in final demand for a given sector. 
In this study, a 43-sector open, static I/O model was used 
to assess the impact of erosion and flooding on the northern Ohio 
regional economy from Labor Day 1972 to Labor Day 1976 (Hushak, 
et al, 1984). The study region covered by the model is shown in 
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Figure 5 and includes not only the eight counties which border 
the Lake, but nine others in northern Ohio that are directly 
affected by economic activities relating to Lake Erie. 
The usual application of an I/O model allows one to trace 
the impact of expenditures made by a particular sector on the 
rest of the economy since spending by that sector generates new 
output, income and employment under the assumption of unemployed 
resources in the region. In this report, however, we use the I/O 
model to estimate the quantity of regional output, income and 
employment resources diverted from the usual production of goods 
and services to the restoration, replacement or protection of 
private property because of real or anticipated storm-related 
damages. Under the assumption that there is full employment of 
all resources in the region, resources which are used to replace 
or restore property or to invest in shore protection must be 
obtained from other sectors of the economy. 
Estimates of Total Impact 
Ideally, to determine the impact of storm-related floods and 
erosion on the northern Ohio regional economy, the sectors from 
which purchases were made to restore, replace and/or protect 
private property should be identified. However, because detailed 
information was not available, the descriptive data in Tables 5 
and 8 were used to allocate the purchases to the appropriate 
sectors. 
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Figure 5. Study Region Covered by the I/O Model. 
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Although a number of sectors were probably affected, it is 
likely that the construction sector was most affected since the 
largest share of the damage and protection costs occurred in the 
"structures and contents," "grounds and improvements," and 
"protective structures" categories. Listed in Table 9 are some 
of the other possible sectors affected, based upon the descrip-
tive detail found in the sample questionnaires. The average 
output multiplier and total income and employment effects for 
these sectors are similar to those of the construction sector. 
For these reasons, we assumed that all damage repair and pro-
tection expenditures were made in the construction sector. 
Private Expenditures 
Column 1 of the "Private Expenditures" section of Table 10 
lists total damage and protection costs relating to floods and 
erosion. It was assumed that all of these expenditures were made 
within the study region. 
Column 2 summarizes the total sales or resources required to 
restore or replace those destroyed resources. The estimates were 
calculated by multiplying Column 1 (direct spending) by the 
output multiplier of the construction sector (1.72). The results 
indicated that direct spending associated with erosion and 
flood-related damage required more than $111 million of regional 
resources during the four-year period. Similarly, the more than 
$38 million of protection-related expenditures required almost 
$66 million of resources which could have been used by other 
sectors to produce other goods and services. 
32 
Table 9. Impact coefficients of Sectors Potentially Affected by Erosion 
and Flood-Related Damages and Protection Costs, 1972-1976. 
Total Total 
Output Income Employment 
Sector Multiplier 1 Effect1 Effect2 
Construction 1. 72 .26 19.70 
Furniture/Fixtures 1.94 .44 24.67 
Misc. Machinery 1.81 .27 17.70 
Stone, Clay, Glass 1. 76 .33 20.50 
Electricity, Gas, Sanitary 1.63 .10 8.75 
Wood/Lumber 1.50 .20 15.50 
Average 1. 72 .32 17.80 
1oollars per dollar of final demand. 
2Man-years per million dollars of final demand. 
Source: Apraku, 1983. 
. . 
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Columns 3 and 4 of Table 10 show the effects of damage and 
protection expenditures on regional income and employment. These 
estimates were derived by multiplying direct spending by the 
total income and employment effects of the construction sector: 
.26 and 19.7, respectively. Income transferred from other 
activities to repair flood and erosion damages within the region 
totaled $16.8 million. Protection expenditures transferred 
nearly $10 million of income. Approximately 1273 man-years of 
employment were required for damage replacement expenditures and 
another 755 man-years of employment were required for protection-
re lated expenditures. In total the $102.95 million of direct 
costs of damage to and protection of private property reduced 
other regional activity by $177 million of output, $27 million of 
income and 2028 man-years of employment from 1972 to 1976. 
Operation Foresight projects were estimated to have pre-
vented $22 million of damage to selected Ohio shoreline sites 
through 1974. If this damage estimate is accurate, total flood 
and erosion damages would have been 21 percent greater than they 
were. Resource use in terms of output, employment and income 
would also have increased by 21 percent. Further, resources 
needed to restore public facilities are unknown because we did 
not have data on damages to public facilities. 
Net Impact of Storms on the Regional Economy 
Protection-related expenditures made through Operation 
Foresight amounted to $8.8 million. Since these resources were 
used largely to protect private property at selected sites along 
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Table 10. Impact of Private Expenditures on the Northern Ohio Economy, 
1972-1976. 
Direct 
Spending Output Income Employment 
($ mil.) ($ mil.) ($ mil.) (man-years) 
Private Expenditures 
Damage 
Flooding 32.22 55.42 8.38 634.7 
Erosion 32.39 55.71 8.42 638.1 
Total 64.61 111.13 16.80 1272.8 
Costs of Protection 
Flooding 16.82 28.93 4.37 331.4 
Erosion 21.52 37.01 5.59 423.9 
Total 8.80 64.94 9.96 755.3 
Total 102.95 177.07 26.76 2028.1 
Public Exeenditures 
Operation Foresight 8.80 8.80 1.23 78.3 
Net Imeact of Storms on 
the Regional Econom~I 94.15 168.27 25.53 1949.8 
1Net impact = Total Private Expenditures - Public Expenditures. 
Sources: Bedford, et al. 1978. 
. . 
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Lake Erie, they offset private expenditures for protection as 
reported in the Corps of Engineers study. The $8.8 million of 
direct spending on protection in turn generated over $15 million. 
of output, $2 million of income and 173 man-years of employment. 
The last section of Table 10 summarizes the net impact of 
storms on the regional economy from 1972 to 1976. More than $94 
million in regional expenditures were incurred to restore, 
replace and protect private property during that period, which 
required $168 million of output, $25.5 million of income and 1950 
man-years of employment resources from the economy. 
Table 11 contains information on the impact of federal aid 
spent for restoration, replacement and protection of public 
property on regional output, income and employment. Federal aid 
represents new resources to the region. Assuming that the grants 
were given in cash, only the secondary or indirect effects on 
output, income and employment would divert resources from the 
usual production of goods and services. Therefore, the $2.9 
million of federal aid granted to disaster counties which 
generated nearly $5 
($4.99-$2.90 million) 
million of output required $2 million 
of regional resources. Diversions of 
income and employment resources also occurred but they were 
insignificant compared to those resulting from private damage and 
protection-related expenses. 
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Table 11. Impact of Public Expenditures on the Northern Ohio Economy, 
1972-1976. 
Direct 
Spending Output Income Employment 
($ mil.) ($ mil.) ($ mil.) (man-years) 
Disaster Relief 
Nov. 1972 Storm .62 1.07 .16 12.21 
Mar. 1973 Storm 1.42 2.44 .37 27.97 
Apr. 1974 Storm .86 1.48 .22 16.94 
Total 2.90 4.99 .75 57 .12 
Source: Deborah Patchen, Personal Communication, 1984. 
. . 
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Annual and Per Storm Estimates of Impact on Northern Ohio 
In the previous section, we estimated the economic impacts 
of the three storms during the four year period, 1972-76. For 
policy purposes, however, expected annual costs are more useful. 
In this section, we converted the four year impacts to per year 
and per storm bases, and then generated an annual expected impact 
of storms estimate. 
Average annual private damage and protection costs for the 
four year period were $25.7 million which required $44.3 million 
of output, $6.7 million of income and 507 man-years of resources 
annually from the study region (Table 12). On a per-storm basis, 
direct spending amounted to $34.3 million which required $59 
million of output, $8.9 million of income and 676 man-years of 
employment from the regional economy. 
Estimates of Expected Annual Resource Diversion Due to Storms 
Historic data indicate that since 1861, there have been 12 
severe northeast storms occurring when Lake Erie water levels 
were above their long-term average (including the three covered 
in this report) and three storms occurring when the levels were 
below average (Figure 2). Since 1861, Lake Erie water levels 
have been above average half of the time. Therefore, in any 
future year when Lake Erie levels are above average, the pro-
bability that a severe storm will occur is 12/58 or 21 percent. 
During a future year when the Lake level falls below its long-
term average, the probability of a severe storm occurring is 3/58 
or five percent. 
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To estimate the expected annual impact in terms of output, 
income and employment on northern Ohio due to storm-related 
damage and costs of protection, the per storm estimates from 
Table 12 are multiplied by the respective above and below-average 
storm probabilities. The results, summarized in Table 12, 
indicate that in high water years, the annual expected storm-
related costs to the region are $7.2 million which utilizes $12.4 
million of output, $1.9 million of income and 142 man-years of 
employment. In low water years, the annual expected storm-
related costs are $1.7 million which direct $3 million of output, 
$450 thousand of income and 34 man-years of employment from the 
production of regular goods and services of the region. 
Conclusions and Implications 
Summary 
In November 1972, April 1973 and March 1974, Ohio's Lake 
Erie shoreline counties experienced severe storms that caused 
extensive erosion and flood damage to both public and private 
property. As a result of those storms, the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers conducted surveys of private property owners along the 
Lake to gather information about the amount and types of damages 
sustained by the region and costs associated with shoreline 
protection from Labor Day 1972 to Labor Day 1976. 
The study results showed that most of the $64 million of 
flood and erosion damages occurred to residential properties in 
the four western Ohio counties bordering Lake Erie. 
• 
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Table 12. Annual, Per Storm and Expected Annual Impact of Private Expen-
ditures on the Northern Ohio Economy, 1972-1976. 
Direct 
Spending 
( $ mil.) 
Output 
( $ mil.) 
Income 
($ mil.) 
Employment 
(man-years) 
Per Year 
Damage 
Cost of Protection 
Total 
Per Storm 
Damage 
Cost of Protection 
Total 
Expected Annual 
High Water Year1 
Damage 
Cost of Protection 
Total 
Low Water Year2 
Damage 
Cost of Protection 
Total 
16 .15 
9.59 
25.74 
21.54 
12.78 
34.32 
4.52 
2.68 
7.20 
1.08 
.64 
1. 72 
27.78 
16.49 
44.27 
37.04 
21.98 
59.02 
7.78 
4.62 
12.40 
1.85 
1.10 
2.95 
4.29 
2.49 
6.69 
5.60 
3.32 
8.92 
1.18 
.70 
1.88 
.28 
.17 
.45 
1calculated by multiplying per storm estimates by 21 percent, the 
probability of a storm occurring in a high water year. 
2calculated by multiplying per storm estimates by five percent, the 
probability of a storm occurring in a low water year. 
Source: Calculated from Table 10. 
318. 20 
188.83 
507.03 
424.27 
251. 77 
676.04 
89 .10 
52.87 
141.97 
21. 21 
12.59 
33.80 
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Most of the $38 million of flood and erosion protection 
costs were also spent by owners of residential properties in the 
western basin counties although expenditures on erosion pro-
tection were more evenly spread among the eight shoreline 
counties. Federal disaster grants to northern Ohio counties over 
the study period amounted to $2.9 million and the value of 
Operation Foresight projects completed in Ohio exceeded $8.8 
million. 
To determine the impact on the northern Ohio regional 
economy of erosion and flood-related damages and protection 
costs, the output multiplier and total income and employment 
effects of the construction sector were used. The results showed 
that the $103 million of storm damage and related shore pro-
tection costs required $177 million of output, $27 million of 
income and 2028 man-years of employment resources from the region 
over the four-year study period which was offset somewhat by the 
influx of federal funds in the form of Operation Foresight 
resources totaling over $8.8 million. The net impact on northern 
Ohio of the more than $94 million of flood and erosion-related 
expenditures was a diversion of $168 million of output, $25.5 
million of output and 1950 man-years of employment from pro-
duction of the usual set of goods and services. Using historical 
data, the expected annual cost of storm damage and protection in 
northern Ohio is $7.2 million in a high water year and $1.72 
million in a low water year. The output, income and employment 
resources required to satisfy these costs would be $12.4 million, 
. ' 
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$1.9 million and 142 man-years, respectively, in a high water 
year and $3 million, $450 thousand and 34 man-years, respec-
tively, in a low water year. 
Study Limitations 
Because certain information was inaccessible, it was 
impossible to identify the sectors in northern Ohio from which 
private property owners made purchases for the restoration and 
protection of their properties. The data limitation also 
prohibited an accurate determination of the share of public and 
private expenditures that went to each of those sectors. Although 
assigning all expenditures made during the four year period to 
the construction sector is reasonable, at best, it provides only 
a rough estimate of the impact that floods and erosion had on the 
northern Ohio regional economy from 1972 to 1976. 
The magnitude of public funds spent within the region over 
the study period is almost certainly understated in this report 
since federal disasters are declared only when "local and state 
resources have been exhausted." The report also does not include 
estimates of public funding for the routine repair and/or 
protection of state parks and beaches, highways and other public 
properties along the shore. Although state and county officials 
were contacted and asked for information concerning such expen-
ditures, they could not provide it because the data did not exist 
or because the figures were not readily accessible. Also, Corps 
of Engineers personnel contacted in the course of assembling 
background data for this report indicated that Section 14 or 
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"small projects" funds were spent on certain local emergency 
shore protection projects along Ohio's Lake Erie shoreline during 
the study period (exclusive of Operation Foresight projects). 
However, those data were not available either. 
This report focused on flood and erosion damages and 
protective measures attributable to the three major storms of the 
study period. Although all flood damage and protection costs can 
reasonably be attributed to storms, erosion is a continual 
process on the Lake which is worsened under high water conditions 
and which can become severe during storms. To the extent that 
erosion damages and protection costs were made to eliminate or 
reduce that baseline type of erosion, estimates of annual and 
per-storm expenditures are somewhat high. 
Although questionnaires distributed by the Corps of En-
gineers solicited information from respondents about physical 
losses of their beach and bluff property through erosion, an 
economic value was not assigned to these losses. Therefore, the 
final damage estimates may be understated, especially in the 
central basin counties where reported losses of beach area and 
bluff volumes were nearly twice those of western basin counties. 
(Data on beach and bluff loss from the tables accompanying the 
Corps of Engineers report were provided by study respondents. 
These estimates were not extrapolated to the whole population so 
it was impossible to ascertain the actual magnitude of beach and 
bluff losses). 
• 
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The three storms of this study period were atypical in that 
they occurred so closely in time, yet there is no evidence that 
these storms were any more or less severe than those of the past. 
To the extent that they may have been more severe than normal, 
per-storm estimates of future damage in a high water year (Table 
12) are overstated. 
Implications 
Prior to the storms discussed in this report, the last one 
of comparable magnitude and destructiveness occurred in 1952. 
Since that time, Ohio's Lake Erie coastline has undergone 
unprecedented growth and development. In fact today, Lake Erie's 
Ohio shoreline is the most urbanized of the Great Lakes' shore-
lines, an important reason why recenterosion and flooding have 
been so costly to the region (GLBFd, 1976). The Great Lakes 
Basin Framework Study in 1976 projected that growth and develop-
ment along the shore would continue and that urban areas would 
gain primarily at the expense of cropland (which is largely found 
in the western basin, the area suffering the most damage from 
recent storms and where construction of the Lake-based recreation 
facilities such as marinas has grown fastest). Federal aid 
granted to selected northern Ohio communities in the aftermath of 
the storms came only after local resources were exhausted and it 
was designated for replacement or restoration of public property. 
Since shore development is expected to continue, placing increas-
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ingly valuable property at risk of storm damage, it seems 
imperative that local resources be mobilized to build permanent 
shore protection structures. 
The estimates of expected annual diversion of output 
resources from the regional economy for storm-related restoration 
and protection of property ($6.S million in high water years and 
$1.S million in low water year) serves as a benchmark for 
investment in shore protection. Since the early 1970s Lake Erie 
water levels have remained above the long-term average and, since 
there is no indication that water levels will decline in the near 
future, it is reasonable to conclude that the $6.S million 
estimate is the better investment benchmark figure. 
The issue of who should bear the costs of protecting the 
Lake Erie shoreline is critical. Funds to protect state and 
federally-owned properties may be generated through general sales 
or income taxes. Matching funds for large local projects may be 
offered to communities located in more susceptible areas. At the 
county, city or township level, an assessment based on frontage 
may be collected in order to generate funds to build shore 
protection structures. 
• 
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